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CUSTOMARY INDIGENOUS LAW IN THE MEXICAN JURIDICAL SYSTEM
Jeffrey N. Gesell*
The tragedy which we mourn today with all our pain, far
from sowing more hatred and division among the Chiapans,
should push all of us toward the path of rejecting violence,
of understanding and of agreements for peace and social
justice in the entire state of Chiapas.
- Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo on the December 1997 massacre of 45
churchgoers in southern Mexico.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1994, an armed rebellion comprised mainly of indigenous
peoples from the Tzotzil, Tzeltal and Tojobal Indian groups marched out of
the hills and overran several towns in the impoverished Mexican state of
Chiapas. The new year dawned on one of the most serious armed insurgen-
cy movements to face Mexico in two decades, a revolution which shed light
on Mexico's unenviable human rights record and gave voice to Mexican
indigenous peoples' unprecedented demands for greater democratization,
amelioration of their often abysmal standards of living, and reformation of
the Mexican juridical system. In the Chiapas mountain town of San
Cristobal de las Casas, the insurgents made their way to the local paper, El
Tiempo-a publication that had often advanced the cause of the indigenous
peoples-and proclaimed the nature and intent of the uprising, which they
named the "Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional" (EZLN) ("the
National Liberation Army of the Faction of Zapata"), invoking the figure of
Emiliano Zapata, another Mexican revolutionary who had championed the
rights of indigenous peoples and rural farmworkers.'
In a manifesto issued by the EZLN, the indigenous peoples summarized
their demands in the following ten points: (1) Work, (2) Land, (3) Shelter,
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(4) Nutrition, (5) Health, (6) Education, (7) Liberty, (8) Democracy, (9)
Justice, and (10) Peace.2
Following a cease fire between the armed rebel insurgents and the
Mexican Army and the appointment of Lic. Manuel Camacho Solis as
commissioner of Peace and Reconciliation, the EZLN sent thirty-four
"Demands and Engagements" to Camacho for review and response by the
government of Mexico. The Mexican government gave a specific answer
to each of the demands on March 2, 1994.'
The government responded in most detail to the EZLN's demand for its
own system of justice. In its seventeenth demand, the EZLN sought "[t]hat
justice be administered by our own indigenous peoples according to our
customs and traditions, without the intervention of illegitimate and corrupt
governments."5 To this demand, the Mexican government asserted that it
would "promote amendments in order to facilitate the creation of judicial
districts coinciding geographically with indigenous communities." These
amendments would provide that judges in these districts, "may be Indians
themselves or Mestizo professionals respected in indigenous communities;
be familiar with Mexico's positive law; and be willing to always take into
consideration the (indigenous peoples) usages and customs in adjudicating
their controversies. '"6
In February of 1996, Zapatista rebels met with leaders of the Mexican
government in hopes of making progress toward peace. On the sixteenth of
February, both sides signed documents of compromise. The documents
included propositions for modifications of legislation on a national scale,
reformations of the Mexican Constitution, and modifications of local
government. The agreements also contained concrete proposals concerning
the governance of the state of Chiapas, a state with a high indigenous
population. These documents comprised some gains of landmark status for
indigenous peoples. One of the documents stated: "The national govern-
ment must recognize the indian townspeople as the possessors of the rights
of free determination and autonomy ... the legal reforms that are promised
2 Id.
3 Jorge A. Vargas, Nafta, the Chiapas Rebellion, and the Emergence of Mexican Ethnic
Law, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 17 (1994).
4 Id.
5Demand and Compromisesfor a DignifiedPeace in Chiapas San Cristobalde las Casas,
17 (Mar. 2, 1994), cited in, Vargas, supra note 3, at 76 (translation by Vargas).
6 Vargas, supra note 3, at 22.
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will need to demonstrate the fundamental judicial principle of the equality
of all Mexicans under the law and the legislative, it cannot be a creation of
special interests and privileged parties, it must respect the principle that the
Mexican nation has a multi-cultural composition, originally sustained in the
indigenous townspeople."7
The agreement of February sixteenth specifically addressed the subject of
judicial reforms when it stated that the government committed itself to
recognising "pluri-culturality in the national juridical system," including the
acceptance of "the specific competence and jurisdiction of the authorities
designated within the communities."8
The grave necessity for such judicial reform was brought sharply into
focus in December of 1997 when gunmen, identified by many as followers
of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, killed 45 churchgoers who
were praying for peace in a remote village of Chiapas.9 The victims were
among the members of a nonviolent civic group which acknowledged
support for Zapatista autonomy demands, and most were refugees who had
come into the village in order to escape conflict in the region.'" President
Ernesto Zedillo pledged the support of the federal government in halting the
violence, and, in the wake of the violence, said that the Mexican government
"reaffirms its willingness to arrive at agreements that, within the framework
of the constitution, establish the conditions to allow Chiapas to have peace
and resolve its social problems and the old injustices that are at the root of
many of the acts of violence that people of Chiapas have suffered.""
Recognizing the indigenous peoples' right to a means of recourse to
customary indigenous law and indigenous legal authorities would be a
7Guadalupe Irizar, Reformaran Leyes para Lograr la Paz, REFORMA, Feb. 17, 1996, at
3: ("La legislacion nacional debe reconocer a los pueblos indigenas como los sujetos de los
derechos a la libre determinacion y la autonomia ... las reformas legales que se promoveran
deberan partir del principio juridico fundamental de la igualdad de todos los Mexicanos ante
la ley y los organos jurisdiccionales y no creacion de fueros especiales en privilegio de
persona alguna, respetando el principio de que la Nacion Mexicana tiene una composicion
pluricultural sustentada originalmente en sus pueblos indigenas.") (Translation by author).
8 Chiapas Produces New Indian Charter: Agreement on Self-Rule and Separate Judicial
Systems, LATIN AMERICA WEEKLY REPORT, Feb. 8, 1996.
9 James F. Smith, Chiapas Gunmen Kill at Least 45 Churchgoers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1997.
" James F. Smith, Bishop Lashes Out as Mexico Buries 45 Slain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1997.
" Smith, supra note 9.
19971
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
significant step towards the resolution of social problems in Chiapas. This
article will provide an argument demonstrating that the form of juridical self-
determination promised in southern Mexico does not lead to fragmentization
or jurisdictional balkanization, perennial concerns upon which objections to
grants of self-determination are often founded. Demands for recognition of
traditional cultural law by the indigenous groups of southern Mexico (and the
indigenous peoples worldwide who, as heirs to the Zapatista movement, may
model their movements upon the demands made by the Mexican Indians),
are legitimately founded upon international legal instruments. Moreover,
these judicial reforms are necessitated by the socio-political marginalization
facing the indigenous population in southern Mexico and by the economic
exigencies produced by trade globalization and neo-liberal economic
adjustment programs.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Spaniards' belief in the inherent inferiority of the indigenous
population pervaded the theory and practice of the colonial juridical system.
Although the Spanish crown and the papacy derived political legitimation for
the conquest from various sources, including the papal bulls of Alexander IV
and the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), the conceptual legitimation of the
subjugation of indigenous populations played itself out in the many tracts
and polemics of the time. 2 Some polemicists and theorists affirmed the
legitimacy of the conquest through their conceptualization of the Indians as
"barbarous, wreched sinners, and depraved infidels .. ." who "may be
counted among the ranks of those possible subjects of Christendom, under
the jurisdiction of the papacy, who may at any time annul the organization
and judicial rights of the gentiles."' 3 Following the reasoning of men such
as Solorzano Periera, the legal propositions advanced on behalf of the rights
of possession asserted by the Spanish crown and against the human rights of
the indigenous peoples included Divine right, treasure trove and the inherent
barbarism of the Indians. 4 Solorzano's justifications and Spanish claims
12 RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN, DERECHO INDiGENA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN AMtRICA
LATINA 15 (1988).
3 Id. (translation by author).
14 SILVIo A. ZAVALA, LAS INSTITUCIONES JURIDICAS EN LA CONQUISTA DE AMERICA 27-
28 (1971).
Vocaci6n Divina: Dios, que es quien dispone de los imperios, quiso que
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to New World lands by virtue of their uninhabited status resembled the
doctrine of "terra nullius" which the British used to justify imperial
expansion into Australia among other lands. 5
According to Silvio Zavala, when Alexander Von Humboldt visited New
Spain at the end of the Spanish colonization, he observed that the Indians
resembled a nation apart and despised by all, separated from the Spaniards
and the Mestizos by the laws. 6 From the beginning of this marginaliza-
tion, however, the Indians voiced their dissatisfaction, and advocates such as
Francisco de Vitoria, Antonio de Montesinos, and Fray Bartolome de las
Casas pled their case to Spain and the world.' 7 In fora such as the counsel
of Indians, Fray Bartolome de las Casas denounced the "unjust" conquest,
the "usurpation" of indigenous reigns, the "tyranny" of the system of estates
granted by the Spanish monarchy, and the "robbery" of New World
resources by Spanish despoilers." De las Casas was one of the first to
declare that the indigenous peoples had "rights belonging to them until the
day of judgment."' 9
The Indians are still in the position of voicing demands against an
oppressive and exploitative system of governance. In 1975, organizations of
Mexican indigenous groups appealed the effect of the revised Mexican
Constitution of 1917 and proposed that the government fulfill the spirit and
los indios fuesen sujectos a los espahioles y privados de sus reinos por sus
muchos pecados. Hallazgo: las tierras nuevas y deshabitadas son de
quien las descubre, segtin el Derecho. Si las tierras estdn habitadas, cabe
sujetar a los habitantes por guerra justa, cuando media causa suficiente.
Barbarie: indios por su carencia de raz6n deben sujetarse por ley natural
a los espafioles, quienes los elevarin a la vida racional. Los indios tienen
costumbres depravadas y faltan a la ley de ia naturaleza, para remediar lo
cual pueden intervenir los espafioles. Los indios son infieles y ademis
id6latras, sujetables por ello ....
Id.
IS See generally Diane Otto, A Question of Law or Politics? Indigenous Claims to
Sovereignty in Australia, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 65 (1995); Gary D. Meyers &
John Mugambwa, The Mabo Decision: Australian Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition, 23
ENVTL. L. 1203 (1993).
'6 ZAVALA, supra note 14, at 86 (translation by author).
I See Vargas, supra note 3, at 38.
IS Fray Bartolom6 de Las Casas, MEMORIAL DIRIGIDO AL CONSEJO DE INDIAS, (1562),
cited in STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 299.
" Id. (translation by author).
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the substantive protections of the Constitution.2 ° In the Declaracion de
Temoaya, promulgated in 1979, the indigenous groups of Mexico again took
a stand in favor of reforming the "National Constitution to recognize the
multiethnicity of Mexico" and demanded "that the government of the
Mexican Revolution legally recognize in political reforms the ethnic
complexity of this great nation in which we are all integrated .... ""
Mexico is a federal republic comprised of sovereign and free states. The
Federal Constitution is the model for the political constitutions of each of the
individual states, which do not differ substantially from the Mexican Federal
Constitution. Until 1992, the Mexican Federal Constitution made no mention
of the existence of indigenous peoples or languages in the country, nor did
it recognize Mexican multiethnicity.22 The Constitution contains articles
that provide special guarantees to other categories of citizens: examples
include workers, 23 pregnant women,24 and peasant fieldworkers. 25  The
indigenous peoples, however, did not appear in any part of the Constitution.
Thus were the constitutional framers of 1917 (as were the liberals of 1857,
when the previous version of the Constitution was drafted) able, through the
use of the judicial structure, to erase the legal existence of a large portion of
the Mexican population.26
In 1992, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, responding to demands by
indigenous groups, amended article 4 of the Constitution to read: "The
Mexican nation has a multiethnic composition based originally upon its
indigenous peoples. The law shall protect and promote the development of
20 1 er. Congreso Nacional de Pueblos Indigenas, (1975).
2' Declaracion de Temoaya, (1979), cited in STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 163
(translation by author).
22 STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 303; see generally Guillermo Foris Margadant,
OfficialMexican A ttitudes Toward the Indians: An HistoricalEssay, 54 TULANE L. REv. 964
(1980).
23 "El Congreso de la Uni6n, sin contravenir a las bases siguientes, deberi expedir leyes
sobre el trabajo, las cuales regirin: A.-Entre los obreros,jornaleros, empleados, d6mesticos,
artesanos y, de una manera general, todo contrato de trabajo: I. La duracion de la jornada
maxima ... II. trabajo nocturna..." CONST. art. 123 (Mex.).
24 "Las mujeres, durante los tres meses anteriores al parto, no desempenan trabajos
fisicos." CONST. art. 5 (Mex.).
25 "La propiedad de las tierras y aguas comprendidas dentro de los limites del territorio
nacional corresponde originariamente a la Naci6n, la cual ha tenido y tiene el derecho de
transmitir el dominio de ellas a los particulares constituyendo la propiedad privada . .
CONST. art. 27 (Mex.).
26 STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 303.
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the languages, cultures, practices, customs, resources and specific forms of
social organization of these peoples, guaranteeing to their individual
members an effective access to the judicial system of the State. In the
agrarian suits and proceedings in which those members are a party, their
legal practices and customs shall be taken into account in the terms
established by the law."27 The Mexican Constitutional Amendment appears
to have taken part of its wording from a 1985 amendment to the Constitution
of Guatemala, which likewise recognized the multiethnic complexion of the
nation and provided protections for the indigenous groups which comprise
such a large segment of the populace.2"
These nominal changes in the Mexican Constitution, however, did not
ameliorate the condition of the indigenous peoples, who prepared for ten
years in anticipation of the now famous Zapatista insurgency movement of
1994.29
A. The Peace Accord of February, 1996
Mexico's indigenous groups saw the first fruits of the rebellion in the
signing of a provisional peace accord on February 16, 1996.30 The
delegates in Chiapas discussed five different issues: (1) Lands, territories,
natural resources and autonomy of the indigenous populace; (2) judicial
systems and rights of the indigenous populace; (3) forms of political
organization, representation and participation; (4) education, culture and
means of communication; and (5) cultural identity and the migration of the
27 CONST. art. 4 (Mex).
28Vargas, supra note 3, at 44. The new Guatemalan Constitution of 1985 provides in art.
66: "Protection to Ethnic Groups: Guatemala is formed by different ethnic groups, among
them the indigenous groups of a Mayan origin. The State recognizes, respects and promotes
their way of living, customs, traditions, forms of social organization, the use of indigenous
costumes in men and women, languages and dialects." (translation by Vargas).
29 For excellent treatments of the history of the insurgency see: GUIOMAR ROvIRA,
ZAPATA VIVE: LA REBELION INDIGENA DE CHIAPAS CONTADA POR SUS PROTAGONISTAS,
(1994); Luis MENDEZ AsENsIo & ANTONIO CANO GIMENO, LA GUERRA CONTRA EL TIEMPO:
VIAJE A LA SELVA ALZADA, (1994); GEORGE A. COLLIER, BASTA!: LAND AND THE
ZAPATISTA REBELLION IN CHIAPAS, (1994); SHADOWS OF TENDER FURY: THE LETTERS AND
COMMUNIQUES OF SUBCOMANDANTE MARCOS AND THE ZAPATISTA ARMY OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION, (Trans. Frank Bardacke & Leslie Lopez) (1995); Universidad Nacional
Autonomia de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Economias, CHIAPAS (1996).
30 Guadalupe Irizar, supra note 7.
1997] 649
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 26:643
urban indigenous workers. 3' Measures on the table still include the possible
modification of articles 4 and 115 of the Mexican Constitution, electoral
reformation and the reformation of the state of Chiapas.32
In form and substance, the 1996 accord addressed many of the concerns
raised in the Declaracion de Temoaya long before the EZLN insurgency.33
The focus of the 1996 accord on recognition of the multiethnic character of
the Mexican national culture and national juridical system34 and on
significant reformation of the Mexican Constitution with a view toward
greater and more meaningful integration of the indigenous peoples into the
democratic process 35 find resonance in the demands voiced in the Temoaya
declaration. The issues raised in Temoaya are also reflected in nearly all of
the demands given in the EZLN's 10 point manifesto.
The two principal features of the agreement were political and judicial.
The Mexican government accepted the "right of these [Indian] peoples to
decide on their internal form of government and on the forms of political,
social, economic and cultural organisation which they deem most conve-
3 ' Guadalupe Irizar, Inicia en Chiapas Foro Indigena, REFORMA, Apr. 11, 1996
(translation by author).32 Guadalupe Irizar, La VulnerabilidadDemocratica,REFORMA Mar. 5, 1996 (translation
by author).
3' Declaracion de Temoaya (1979), in STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 184.
34 Nos pronunciamos para que el gobiemo de la Revolucion mexicana
reconozca legalmente, en la Reforma Politica, y no s6lo de palabra, la
complejidad 6tnica de esta gran naci6n que todos integramos. Roto ya el
mito del mexicano inico, unificado, debemos hacer una realidad
reconocida: el pluralismo cultural s6lo seri cabalmente reconocido con
la consagraci6n de un Estado multietnico, en el que todos los indigenas
estemos representados.
DeclaracionDe Temoaya, "Estado Multietnico" 1, in STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 185.
35 La consagraci6n de un Estado multitnico requiere una reforma de nuestra
Constituci6n Nacional, reforma por la que lucharemos. Despurs de 450
afios de dominaci6n, tenemos derecho a ser reconocidos por nuestra carta
fundamental. De no ser asi se estari confesando la impotencia del sistema
que nos sentimos inmersos adn. (The consecration of this multiethnic state
requires the reformation of our national constitution, reforms for which
we will fight. After 450 years of domination, we have the right to be
recognized by our fundamental statement. If this does not occur, it will
proclaim the impotence of the system in which we are still immersed.)
Id. (translation by author).
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nient. '"36 The accord specifically stated that a proposal will be put to the
Federal Congress "to recognise in national legislation the [Indian] communi-
ties as public law entities, their right to associate freely in municipalities with
an indigenous majority, as well as the right of several municipalities to
associate with the purpose of coordinating their actions as indigenous
peoples."37
B. Pluriculturality in the Juridical System
In the agreement, the Government also committed itself to recognition of
"pluri-culturality in the national juridical system," including the acceptance
of "the specific competence and jurisdiction of the authorities designated
within the communities.""a In so doing, the government initiated a process
of reformation which may lead to the creation of disparate jurisdictional
pockets in southern Mexico.39 These pockets may approach juridical
reformation by either instituting the substance and procedure of indigenous
law in indigenous communities or by establishing district judges who will
consider applying indigenous customary legal norms in cases involving
indigenous peoples.
Constitutional reforms proposed by the Commission of Peace and
Cooperation (Cocopa) on November 29, 1996, include specific references to
the autonomy of indigenous legal systems: "[t]he indigenous communities
have the right of self-determination and, as an expression of that right, to the
autonomy pertaining to a part of the Mexican state, to: . . . II. Apply their
normative legal systems in the regulation and resolution of internal conflicts,
respecting individual rights, human rights and, in particular, the dignity and
integrity of women; the indigenous communities' substantive and procedural
rules and decisions will be validated by the jurisdictional authorities of the
state."40
Even the government's counterproposal, given to the EZLN on December
19, 1996, nominally guaranteed recognition of legal and jurisdictional
36 Chiapas Produces New Indian Charter: Agreement on Self-Rule and Separate Judicial




40 Reformas ConstitutionalesPropuesta de la Comision de Concordia y Pacificacion, 29
de Noviembrede 1996, http://www.peak.org/-joshua/fzln/cocopa961129-sp.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 1998) (translation by author).
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autonomy, permitting the indigenous communities to: "apply their own rules,
customs and usages in the regulation and resolution of internal conflicts
between their own members, respecting the guarantees which establish this
Constitution and human rights, as well as the dignity and integrity of
women. The local laws will foresee the reconciliation and recognition of
petitions and procedures that will be used for this and will establish the
norms in order that laws and resolutions will be homologated by the
jurisdictional authorities of the state."'' The EZLN leadership, in a
"Communiqu6 of the Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee-
General of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation," rejected the
government's counterproposal in its entirety because the EZLN claimed,
among other reasons, that the government's proposal ignored the San Andres
accords signed by the governmental delegation in February of 1996 and it
attempted to renegotiate the entire first round of talks on "indigenous rights
and culture." With respect to the specific question of indigenous legal and
jurisdictional autonomy, the EZLN objected to the fact that the government's
proposal ostensibly signaled the autonomy of the indigenous peoples and
their right to legal customs and usages of their own, while providing that the
indigenous legal systems will be proscribed by "local laws" and will be
homologated by the jurisdictional authorities of the state.42 In Spanish legal
terminology, to homologate ("homologar") indicates the act of ratifying a
proposal or law in such a fashion as to ensure that it corresponds to
previously fixed norms.
In order for the gains made by the EZLN to survive the process of
ratification by indian communities and enactment into law, the government
and EZLN negotiators must overcome the disagreements, disparate
viewpoints and hostilities which have characterized the talks thus far.43 The
EZLN withdrew from talks last Sept. 2, and has refused to resume negotia-
tions, citing the administration's failure to convert the San Andres accords
into law.4' At the present time, the accords have yet to be ratified,45 and
41 Propuesta del Gobierno de Reformas Constitucionalesen Materia de Derechos de los
Pueblos Indigenas, http://www.peak.org./-joshua/fzln/gobierno97011 l-sp.html (last visited Jan.
21, 1998) (translation by author).




4' Guadalupe Irizar, Concluye Plenaria Sin Acuerdos, REFORMA Aug. 13, 1996;
Guadalupe Irizar, PrevalecenDiferenias,REFORMA Aug. 12, 1996.
" Michael Sheridan, Chuayffet Rebuffs Chiapas Criticism, THE NEWS, Sept. 10, 1997.
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the peace process remains stalled amid accusations of fault by both sides.4 6
Some hope remains, however, that the EZLN, which recently celebrated the
14th year of its existence,47 will renew dialogue with the government.48
III. THE LEGAL LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL SELF-DETERMINATION
The right of Mexican indigenous peoples to have recourse to customary
and tribal law figured prominently in the stalled peace negotiations. This
right comports with standards for the rights of indigenous peoples established
by international instruments in sources such as treaties, conventions and
covenants which constitute the doctrinal basis for the rights of indigenous
and minority populations to sovereignty and self-determination. Recent
developments in international law have provided indigenous peoples with
ever more expansive theoretical bases for judicial self-determination, but
recourse to the standard of these international instruments proves practically
ineffectual.
The practical application of those instruments to the amelioration of the
rights of indigenous peoples is precluded by two significant obstacles. First,
there is disagreement about the definitions of key concepts in many of the
instruments themselves. Second, the international legal materials are
influential, but seldom binding. Those instruments which directly address
the rights of indigenous peoples appear in conventions and declarations
which, as yet, hold relatively little legal or precedential value.
" Chiapas Peace Stalls as Commission Winds Down, THE NEWS, Aug. 15, 1997.
4' Interior Secretary Emilio Chuayffet Chemor has denied that the Zedillo administration
is to blame for the impasse in negotiations with the Zapatistas, and pointed a finger instead
at the Zapatistas, explaining that the Zapatistas rejected the government revisions presented
for EZLN approval Dec. 20, and also failed to respond in March to another government
counter-proposal. Labor Party Deputy Ricardo Cantu Garza has said the peace process "has
not advanced ... because the government has not fulfilled the commitments it made to the
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)." Sheridan, supra note 44.
4' Daniel Pensamiento, Cumplira hoy el EZLN 14 anos de existencia, REFORMA,
November 17, 1997.
48 Existen bases para solucionar el conflicto en Chiapas.-Munoz Ledo, EL NORTE,
September 17, 1997 at 8; ReivindicaelEZLNacuerdos, REORMA, Nov. 29, 1997 at 17; Opto
el gobierno por reventar el proceso de paz, REFORMA, Nov. 19, 1997 at 12.
1997]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
A. The Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples
The strongest doctrinal argument for international legal recognition of
claims by indigenous groups to some form of juridical self-determination
comes from the new Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter "Draft Declaration").49 The Draft Declara-
tion represents the work of over a decade of dialogue with representatives
of indigenous peoples, as well as studies conducted under the auspices of the
U.N. human rights system. In 1982, the Economic and Social Council
established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) with the
dual mandate of annually examining the situation of indigenous peoples
worldwide and considering the development of new international standards
for the recognition and protection of indigenous rights." The July 1994
session included the participation of 44 observer governments, 11 U.N.
agencies and other intergovernmental organizations, 164 indigenous peoples,
organizations and communities, 83 human rights non-governmental
organizations and a large number of individual scholars.5 The United
Nations General Assembly has requested that the declaration be adopted
before the end of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples
(1995 - 2004).52
The substantively groundbreaking Draft Declaration which they produced
represents the recognition of an additional dimension of international human
rights norms. The instrument focuses on indigenous societies as the holders
of rights, since the survival of indigenous populations requires the recogni-
tion and protection of core rights to self-determination, lands and resources
and cultural integrity-rights that flow from the nature of an indigenous
society and preserve its cultural and social cohesion.53
49 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2;
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, Oct. 28, 1994, 105-15, reprintedin 34 I.L.M. 541 (hereinafter Draft
Declaration).
50 Howard R. Berman, Introductory note, Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 34 I.L.M. 541, 541-43 (1995).
5' Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Twelfth Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/30 (1994), cited in Berman, supra note 50.
12 G.A. Res. 48/163, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 28.1, U.N. Doc. A/48/49
(1993).
13 Berman, supra note 50, at 542.
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B. Customary Indigenous Legal Systems
The Draft Declaration addresses, at several points, the right of indigenous
peoples to some forms of juridical self-determination and recourse to
customary legal systems. Article 4 of the Declaration states: "indigenous
peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political,
economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems,
while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 54  The Draft
Declaration further provides: "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to
promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their
distinctive juridical customs, traditions, procedures and practices, in
accordance with internationally recognized human rights standards."55
This Draft Declaration, though an unprecedented and positive recognition
of the exigencies facing indigenous populations, created with the seminal
participation of many indigenous groups, 56 still proves to be the ineffectual
progeny of other international instruments designed to address the issue of
indigenous rights-limited in scope by the same shortcomings which hamper
the effectiveness of its predecessors. Though broader in its aims, the Draft
Declaration suffers from some definitional obscurity: certain governments
from the Asian region continue to express concern that the Working Group
has not promulgated an official definition of "indigenous peoples."57 Many
other governments are resisting the recognition of collective rights and self-
determination implicit in the opening phrase of each article: "indigenous
s4 Draft Declaration, art. 4, supra note 49, at 548.
" Id. at 553.
1
6The preamble states: "Believing that this declaration is a further important step forward
for the recognition, promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples
and in the development of relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field," id.
at 547. Dr. Julian Burger, Secretary of the intergovernmental Working Group on the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, states: "[a] lready the indigenous caucus has
insisted on full and effective participation in the discussion and in some procedural matters
as well as involvement in the final report of the meeting. Over 100 indigenous organizations
have been given the opportunity to participate in the Commission's Working Group. Others
are applying for the same opportunity. Indigenous people have presented powerful and cogent
arguments in favour of the text as it stands and have been able to present unified consensus
statements." Julian Burger, The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 209, 211 (1996).
7 Id. at 210.
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peoples have the rights ... ."" Moreover, the Draft Declaration remains
essentially a non-binding instrument. Not only has it yet to be adopted by
the General Assembly, but the system established for its implementation59
depends upon the proactive participation of governments which count
indigenous peoples among their citizens, many of which have, in practice,
demonstrated a manifest unwillingness to accommodate claims of indigenous
peoples to equal status with other citizens. Claims to legal and political
autonomy may be expected to fare much worse.
C. The Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples6"
holds some of the same promise and suffers from some of the same defects
as the United Nations Draft Declaration. The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR), endowed by the Charter of the Organization of
American States (OAS),61 recognized the need for an instrument that would
protect and define the rights of indigenous peoples. 2 In 1989 the OAS
General Assembly issued a resolution approving the IACHR's proposal to
draft an instrument acknowledging its concern "about the frequest depriva-
tion afflicting indigenous peoples of their human rights and fundamental
58 Id. at 210-11.
59 Part VIII of the draft declaration provides for implementation:
States shall take effective and appropriate measures, in consultation with
the indigenous peoples concerned, to give full effect to the provisions of
this declaration. The rights recognized herein shall be adopted and
included in national legislation in such a manner that indigenous peoples
can avail themselves of such rights in practice ...The organs and
specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other intergovern-
mental organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the
provisions of this Declaration through the mobilization, inter alia, of
financial cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means of
ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall
be established.
Draft Declaration, art. 37, 40, supra note 54, at 554-55.
60 Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved,
February 26, 1997 AG/Res 1022 (XIX - 0/89). Text at http://www.oas.org./EN/PROG/indi-
gene.htm last checked Jan. 21, 1998.
6' Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights During its Nineteenth
Regular Session, at 250 OEA/ser. P, doc. 2518/89, Nov. 17, 1989.62 See, Osvaldo Kreimer, The Beginnings of the Inter-AmericanDeclaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 271, 272 (1996).
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freedoms ... " and "[r]ecognizing the severe impoverishment afflicting
indigenous peoples in several regions of the Hemisphere ...,. In 1994,
the Executive Secretariat of the IACHR prepared a "Draft for Consultation"
which was revised and approved by the IACHR in September 1995 as a
Draft.
64
The Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
addresses the substantive rights of indigenous groups to their own juridical
systems. Article XVI of the Declaration states: "Indigenous law shall be
recognized as a part of the states' legal system and of the framework in
which the social and economic development of the states takes place.
65
The Declaration also addresses the fora in which indigenous law would be
applied: "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain and reinforce their
indigenous legal systems and also to apply them to matters within their
communities, including systems related to such matters as conflict resolution,
crime prevention and maintenance of peace and harmony., 66 In addition,
the Declaration contemplates that procedures concerning indigenous peoples
or their interests shall include "observance of indigenous law and custom
and, where necessary, use of their language., 67  The framers of the
Declaration also intended that the indigenous peoples would have the right
to participate in the incorporation of indigenous legal systems into the
organizational structures of the states.68
Although the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples suffers from some of the same definitional obscurity as the United
63 I.A.C.H.R. Declaration Preamble "2. Eradication of poverty and the right to
development" supra note 60.64 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Commission 1995,
OEA/ser. L./V./II.91, doc. 7, Feb. 28, 1996, at 207-18; see, Kreimer, supra note 62, at 273.
65 IACHR Proposed Declaration, supra note 60, at Art XVI (1).
66 Id. at Art XVI (2).
67 Id. at Article XVI. Indigenous Law (3)
68 "National incorporation of indigenous legal and organizational systems.
1. The states shall facilitate the inclusion in their organizational structures, the institutions and
traditional practices of indigenous peoples, and in consultation and with consent of the peoples
concerned.
2. State institutions relevant to and serving indigenous peoples shall be designed in
consultation and with the participation of the peoples concerned so as to reinforce and
promote the identity, cultures, traditions, organization and values of those peoples." Id. at
Article XVII.
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Nations Draft Declaration,69 it constitutes a strong statement on the rights
of indigenous peoples to juridical self-determination which could prove a
powerful tool. The present draft has been approved by the IACHR for
consultation; it is not, however, the final statement of the OAS on the matter.
Governments, indigenous organizations, other interested institutions and
experts will have a chance to review the draft and present their comments
and suggestions. On the basis of these comments, the IACHR will prepare
its final proposal to be presented to the General Assembly of the OAS.
D. Self-Determination as a Means of Achieving Recourse to Customary
Indigenous Law
The Draft Declaration is not the only legal route to judicial self-determina-
tion. The indigenous populations may demonstrate that they are entitled to
political as well as legal self-determination by invoking the provisions of the
Vienna Declaration and other international human rights instruments.
1. The Historical Background of Self-Determination
The United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights7" did
not explicitly refer to the rights of self determination, although article 21 did
set out rights now identified with internal self determination without labeling
69 The decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to consider self-
identification as a fundamental factor in determining the status of indigenous peoples ("Self
identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for
determining, the groups to which the provisions of this Declaration apply."), id. at Art. 1.
Sec. II, probably will not do much to resolve issues of definitional obscurity. The inherent
difficulty in defining which peoples may or may not be classified as indigenous is evinced in
the definitional passages of drafts of the Inter-American Declaration: "Definition: In this
Declaration indigenous peoples are those who embody historical continuity with societies
which existed prior to the conquest and settlement of their territories by Europeans.
(alternative I) [as well as peoples brought involuntarily to the New World who freed
themselves and cultures from which they have been torn]. (alternative 2) [, as well as tribal
peoples whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections
of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations]." Draft of the Inter-American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 19 September 1995 Art. 1, 1995 Annual
Report of the Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, 203, DEA/ser.L/v/II.91doc.7rev.
70 G.A. Res. 217 A U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
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them as such."1 Self-determination, however, became a main focus of the
General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples.72 The notion of rights to self-determina-
tion appears as well in both of the 1966 covenants on Human Rights.7 3
The recognition of the right to self-determination, however, proved simply
the beginning of the debate, as disagreement arose over the meaning of
"peoples" and the meaning of "self-determination" within the purview of the
instruments. The conventional viewpoint held that "self-determination"
signified only that peoples are entitled to determine their own forms of
government and shape their own juridical processes when such self-
determination meant freedom from colonial domination, especially when
people of color experience domination in their own homeland by other racial
groups.74 Thus, some indigenous and linguistic minorities would not be
able to rely on international law to establish the principle of self-determina-
tion: "the principle [of self-determination] has been confined in international
practice to situations involving separate territories politically and legally
subordinate to an administrative power."75 At the other end of the spec-
trum is the viewpoint, deemed "the controversial view" by Deborah Cass,76
that the right of self-determination extends beyond the colonial context.77
"' Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304 (1994).
72 G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960), cited in Kirgis, supra note 71, at 305.
73 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art.
1. 993 U.N.T.S. 3, citedin Kirgis, supra note 71, at 305. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, cited in Kirgis, supra note 71, at
305.
7' The International Court of Justice has endorsed the principle of self-determination in
this form: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
ICJ Rep. 16, 31 (Advisory opinion of June 21), cited in Kirgis, supra note 71, at 305.
7' Australian Law Reform Commission (A.L.R.C.), Report No. 31, Recognition of
Aboriginal Customary Law, 128 (1986), cited in Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-
Determination: A CriticalAnalysis of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 21 (1992).
76 Cass, supra note 75, at 30.
77 Kirgis lists the various approaches to the meaning of self-determination between these
two extremes:
(3) . . .The right to dissolve a state, at least if done peacefully, and to
form new states on the territory of the former one, as in the former Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. . .(4) The disputed right to secede, as in the
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2. The Threat of Fragmentization
It is thus not a simple task to determine the place of judicial self-
determination, or recourse to customary law, within the framework of
international legal materials. The most significant issue standing in the way
of more widespread grants of autonomy is a concern about the fragmentiza-
tion or dismemberment of states with the resultant potential for conflict, 8
and it should be recognized that, on its face, juridical self-determination may
seem to carry the same threat of jurisdictional fragmentization.
The General Assembly, in its Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations (The Vienna Declaration), recognized
this concern about fragmentization when it disclaimed any intent to authorize
or encourage the dismemberment of states.79 The General Assembly's
disclaimer, however, left a good deal of room in its definition of legitimate
states:80  "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of equal rights and self determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole peoples belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or color."8  The disclaimer
case of Bangladesh and Eritrea. (5) The right of divided states to reunite,
as in Germany. (6) The right of limited autonomy, short of secession, for
groups defined territorially or by common ethnic, religious and linguistic
bonds-as in autonomous areas within confederations. (7) Rights of
minority groups within a larger political entity, as recognized in Article
27 of the covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the General
Assembly's 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. (8) The internal
self-determination freedom to choose one's own form of government, as
in Haiti.
Kirgis, supra note 71, at 307.
78See Brietzke, Self-Determination,or JurisprudentialConfusion: ExacerbatingPolitical
Conflict, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 69 (1995).
79 Kirgis, supra note 71, at 305.
SOId.
SI Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970); quoted in Kirgis, supra note 71, at 305.
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in the Vienna Declaration provided an exemption only for "a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
of any kind." 2 Frederic Kirgis argues that these instruments leave room
to assert a right of self-determination against a government that is unrepre-
sentative or in violation of international legal standards: "[t]he striking
contrast between the 1960 and 1970 General Assembly formulations suggests
that from about 1970 on, there could be a right of "peoples" . . . to secede
from an established state that does not have a fully representative form of
government, or at least to secede from a state whose government excludes
people of any race, creed or color from political representation when those
people are the ones asserting the right and they have a claim to a defined
territory." 3 Actions of the Mexican Army during the Chiapas rebellion and
prior to the rebellion seem to have violated many international legal
standards, 4 including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; the Convention of Rights and
Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife; and the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 5 It may
therefore be argued that Mexican human rights violations have disqualified
the nation from protection from fragmentization.
According to Kirgis, an evaluation of a claim for self-determination must
balance the factor of possible governmental destabilization against the degree
of democratic representation enjoyed by the group seeking self-determina-
tion: claims by the significantly underrepresented indigenous groups of
Chiapas, if it can be shown that such claims would not appreciably
contribute to destabilization, stand a greater chance of success, viewed
against the standard of international legal materials.86
8' Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. 1, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
157/24 (pt. 1) (1993), cited in Kirgis, supra note 71, at 306.
" Kirgis, supra note 71, at 305; see LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 92-96 (1978); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International
Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 269-70, 275 (1981).
84 See Vargas, supra note 3, at 30.
15 Vargas, supra note 3, at 58-59.
16 Kirgis, supra note 71, at 308.
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Recognizing the right of indigenous peoples to some forms of juridical
self-determination and recourse to customary tribal law does not present a
significant threat of jurisdictional fragmentization or conflicts arising from
inconsistent obligations placed upon some citizens. As we will see, many
indigenous tribal groups already regulate relationships in the community
according to the normative influence of tribal legal custom and have done
so for decades; the more serious conflicts arose from the refusal of the
Mexican government to recognize the legal validity of these customary laws.
E. Conflicts Between Customary Law and Indigenous Law
Although the Mexican laws purport to pertain to all Mexicans, regardless
of ethnicity, 7 many Mexican ethnic groups define and regulate transactions
and relationships within the community according to unwritten legal customs
and traditions. Students of pre-colonial Mexico have demonstrated that in
the towns within the extensive territory of the Aztecs there existed sophisti-
cated normative and regulatory judicial structures. 88 Marked vestiges of
these systems still exist today, although much of the time these are
syncretistic legal systems, the progeny of indigenous, colonial and republic
legislation. In view of the possible recognition by the Mexican government
and district judges of the legal legitimacy of these traditions, the traditions
merit more study than they have heretofore received.89
The different approaches to law between government authorities and the
indigenous populations has been the source of much confusion and conflict.
For example, the sole recognized marriage is that defined by the civil laws;
many indigenous communities, however, recognize marriages in accordance
with custom, which are neither recognized by civil law, nor sanctioned by
87 En los Estados Unidos Mexicanos todo individuo gozara de las garantias
que otorga esta Constitucion, las cuales no podran restringirse, ni
suspenderse, sino en los casos y con las condiciones que ella misma
establece. (In the United States of Mexico, each individual will enjoy all
of the guarantees granted by this Constitution, those which can be neither
restrained, nor suspended, except in those cases and under those condi-
tions established by this document.)
CONST. art. 1 (Mex.) (translation by author).
88 STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 300.
89Id.; see JULIAN N. GUERRERO, DERECHO ABORIGEN EN CENTROAMERICA Y EL CARIBE,
(1965); ALICIA CASTELLANOS, NOTAS SOBRE LA IDENTIDAD ETNICA EN LA REGION TZOTSIL
TZELTAL DE LOS ALTOS DE CHIAPAS, (1988).
[Vol. 26:643
CUSTOMARY INDIGENOUS LAW
the Catholic Church.9" This practice has given rise to several conflicts in
the area of inheritance and descent.
In the area of penal legislation, the majority of indigenous groups have
their own customs and laws to regulate internal conflict, a situation which
is the source of permanent and ongoing tensions and conflicts between the
indigenous communities and the judicial authorities of state and federal
governments.9 Generally, in the case of minor infractions committed by
members of indigenous communities, the government authorities try to
refrain from intervening in the resolution of the conflict. When faced with
crimes of a more serious nature, however, the government authorities step
in, notwithstanding efforts by the indigenous communities to resolve the
conflict in accordance with customary mechanisms of resolution.92
Rodolfo Stavenahgen cites two examples of the discord created by the
competing legal systems. In an indigenous community in the Mexican state
of Oaxaca, an individual killed his friend while both were embroiled in a
drunken dispute. After several days of consultation, a council of elders,
invested with customary and traditional authority, decided that the culprit, an
unmarried man, should marry the victim's widow and provide for the
economic sustainment of the victim's family. Thus was the culprit made to
assume responsibility for his actions by providing for the maintenance of the
family; the social equilibrium of the community was preserved and some of
the potential conflicts between the families involved was defused.
Nevertheless, the governmental judicial authorities stepped in with the
intent of apprehending the criminal. The indigenous community refused to
deliver the man over to the authorities and it was only the threat of armed
conflict between the indigenous group and the army which influenced the
governor of Oaxaca to respect the decision of the elders.93
Among the Huichole Indians of Nayarit, the indigenous governor of the
community urged an individual who had committed a homicide to present
himself before the national justice system for trial, which he did of his own
accord. As the Mexican judge hearing the case had neither documentation
of the case, nor testimony of the occurrence, and considering self-confession
inappropriate grounds for the charge of murder, he decided not to pursue the
case and freed the murderer.94
90 STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 309.
9' Id. at 310.
92 id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 310-11 (translation by author).
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These accounts demonstrate some of the fundamental conceptual barriers
which divide the indigenous peoples and the Mexican authorities. They also
demonstrate that, instead of creating conflict, applying indigenous customary
law to internal disputes between members of the indigenous communities
may indeed resolve much of the confusion which exists between Indigenous
communities and the Mexican authorities.
Moreover, the fact that demands for judicial autonomy amount to much
less than outright secession further confirms the validity of the demands.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded that interna-
tional law does not recognize the right of an ethnic group such as the
Miskito population of Nicaragua to secede, in the sense of shaping its own
form of political organization." But, because the establishment of a right
to customary forms of law does not constitute full secession, this particular
demand by the Mexican insurgents may not specifically contravene OAS
precedents in Latin America.
F. Conclusions
The conclusion of a survey of the international legal materials demon-
strates that indigenous peoples of Chiapas, and those whose movements are
or will be modeled after the example set in Chiapas, may assert a legitimate
right to juridical autonomy or recourse to customary tribal law in the
declarations and conventions which constitute the international law applicable
to indigenous populations. Regrettably, however, few of these materials
have attained either binding precedential value or the economic and political
backing of signatory nations, and thus guerrilla warfare has proven to be one
of the few ways by which the indigenous communities may provide the
practical leverage necessary for the attainment of human and civil rights.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF JURIDICAL SELF-DETERMINATION
The rights of indigenous peoples to recourse to customary tribal law is
necessitated by the social and economic exigencies facing the Mexican
indigenous population. These particular exigencies have arisen as a result
of the marginalization of indigenous peoples which occurs when the welfare
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of Human Rights
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62,
doc. 10, rev. 3 (1983).
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of the Indian groups is at odds with the collective practices or economic
interests of the Mexican government or its representatives.
A. Judicial Oppression and Social Reasons Necessitating Judicial Self-
Determination
Independent human rights organizations have documented the record of
Mexico's appalling violations of the human rights of indigenous peoples, the
vast majority of which occur in rural areas.96 Most indigenous peoples in
Mexico are farmers or fieldworkers by trade; the land provides for the
sustainment of their livelihoods and it has also served as the instrument
through which the Mexican government and judicial system have adminis-
tered the greatest inequities. The division of previously ethnic lands and the
dispersion of indigenous populations into disparate administrative and
territorial divisions occurred with frequency and, it has been argued, with a
measure of intentionality. 97 Within the state of Oaxaca, for example, where
the indigenous population accounts for over 50 per cent of the total
population, there exist more than 500 municipal divisions, each of which
scarcely comprise more than a small central community (and some outlying
localities). 98 The political privation of the indigenous peoples thus resulted
from a lack of bases of collective territorial, jurisdictional recognition; 99
various states of the republic had territorial and population sizes which were
less than the populations of indigenous groups. These states were construct-
96 See MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVILIANS AT RISK: MILITARY AND
POLICE ABUSES IN THE MEXICAN COUNTRYSIDE (1993); MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, CONQUEST CONTINUED: DISREGARD FOR HUMAN AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE
MEXICAN STATE OF CHIAPAS (1992); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE AMERICAS: HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1992); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
MEXICO HUMAN RIGHTS IN RURAL AREAS; EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS WITH THE MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN OAXACA AND CHIAPAS (1986).
97 
"La intenci6n del legislador "fue clara": promover la fragmentaci6n y atomizaci6n de
la identidad 6tnica para impedir la conformaci6n de identidades politicas mis amplias y por
lo tanto potencialmente mis poderosas." (The legislator's intentions are clear: to promote the
fragmentation and scattering of the ethnic entities in order to impede the strengthening of
tribal ties and the creation of more ample and potentially more powerful political entities.)
STAVENHAGEN, supra note 12, at 304 (translation by author).
9 Politically and economically, the free municipality, the basis of the territorial politico-
administrative structure of the country exercises practically no real power in the Mexican
state." Id. (translation by author).
99 Id.
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ed in the past century as a function of the interests of economic groups or
political or military leaders (caudillos) of mestizos or criollos (creoles).'00
Though some anti-poverty programs have been established, these programs
have only nominally affected the indigenous population,' which remains
subject to political and judicial manipulation.
The patterns of this manipulation are evinced throughout the region; one
example may suffice to provide an outline of the nature of the abuses. A
confidential document written by highly placed officials in the federal
government blamed the then governor of the state of Chiapas, Patrocinio
Gonzalez Garrido, "not only for permitting a feudal land system to persist,
but also for helping large landowners repress indian peasants ... in 1992,
he had ordered the arrest of three solidarity officials on charges of fraud,
embezzlement and corruption after they refused to let him administer federal
anti-poverty funds."'01 2 In spite of the fact that president Salinas knew of
the reputation associated with the governor of Chiapas, Salinas rewarded
Gonzalez Garrido, a member of the PRI, by appointing him to the most
powerful political post in the Mexican cabinet: secretary of the interior
(Secretario de Gobernacion).' °3
During the 1994 uprising, it appears the Mexican Army violated several
specifically enumerated rights granted to all Mexican citizens by the Mexican
Constitution. The erection of barricades and the establishment of military
checkpoints by the Mexican Army violates Mexican constitutional provisions
for "freedom of transit";10 4 documented refusals to permit public assembly
near the theater of EZLN operations violates constitutional guarantees of the
"right to assemble or associate peaceably for any lawful purpose . . .; 105
and the Mexican Army's often violent intrusions into homes and destruction
of property in Chiapas violate Mexican constitutional provisions for due
process'0 6 and for prohibitions of molestation of person, family, domicile,
papers, or property without legally stated reasons.0 7
100 Id.
'0' S. Lynne Walker, Chiapas, Mexico, Too Little Too Late: Rebel Uprising Exposes
Holes in Salinas' Safety Net For the Poor, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 11, 1994.
102 Tod Robberson, Mexican Cabinet Shake-up Called Sign of Willingness to Talk with
Rebels, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1994 at A- 13.
"
3Id. (A few days after the uprising in Chiapas, Gonzalez Garrdido was forced to submit
his resignation).
104 CONST. art. 11 (Mex.).
105 CONST. art. 9 (Mex.).
106 CONST. art. 14 (Mex.).
107 CONST. art. 16 (Mex.); see, Vargas, supra note 3, at 16-20.
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Mexican Army practices of torture violate international standards..8 as
well as Mexican constitutional provisions. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional, methods of torture include: "beatings ... electric shocks ...
submerging the victim's head in water until near suffocation occurs ... [a]
widespread and unique method of torture involves the introduction of
mineral water laced with hot chili peppers into the nasal passages of the
victim ... [t]he placement of plastic bags over the victim's head to the point
of near asphyxiation . rape and sexual abuse ... psychological torture is
also common and takes the form of death threats and mock executions
"7109
These occasions of human rights violations occur against the backdrop of
institutional oppression enacted into law in the form of the Chiapas Penal
Code.10 The crime of sedition is defined as a gathering of citizens in
large numbers to resist public authorities with the purpose of abolishing or
amending the State Constitution, to subtract power from the authority of the
state, or deprive certain state powers of their functions. "' The definition
of a riot is applied, among other things, to situations in which individuals are
gathered in large numbers to exercise a right or resist public authorities in
the exercise of their functions to compel these authorities to make a
decision." 2 "The code provides for a variety of vaguely defined political
offenses that state government officials may selectively enforce against
dissident peasants or political opponents to maintain its tight control over the
state population."" 1
3
In San Cristobal de las Casas, a town in Chiapas with a significant
indigenous population, "unemployment exceeds 60 per cent; Mexican
government census bureau statistics report that 78 per cent of the population
live in overcrowded shacks with dirt floors, 66 per cent of which lack
los Vargas, supra note 3, at 58-59.
" Vargas, supra note 3, at 33, quoting 19th 90-Day Report on Mexico, Current
Developments in Mexico, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations, and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1990).
"o Codigos Penal y de Procedimientos Penales para el Estado de Chiapas, Editorial
Porrua, Mexico (1993).
.. Vargas, supra note 3, at 23.
112 Id.
"
3Id. at 24, citingMINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONQUEST CONTINUED:
DISREGARD FOR HUMAN AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE MEXICAN STATE OF CHIAPAS 5
(1992) supra note 90, at ix.
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electricity, 40 per cent lack sewers and water. More than 40 per cent of the
people are illiterate and 62 per cent never completed the 6th grade."
'
"1 4
Thus, indigenous peoples have few financial or educational resources to fight
these constitutional violations.
Violations of international standards and of Mexico's own constitutional
provisions create a situation in which Mexico's indigenous peoples have
become an oppressed minority in a country which purports to grant them
equal status and constitutional protection. Affording Mexico's indigenous
population recourse to customary laws or, at the least, to adjudication before
a district judge from the indigenous community or acceptable to the
community, will not put an end to human rights abuses. These measures
will, however, provide a greater check on governmental violations of human
rights and will ensure that a greater number of human rights abuses go to
trial.
B. Economic Exigencies Necessitating Judicial Self-Determination
Mexican economic adjustment programs, which have steadily moved the
country from a nationalized, protectionist economy to one of privatization,
also create a need for development of legal systems which take particular
needs of the indigenous peoples into account. The Mexican approach to the
debt crisis of the 1980's was implementation of neo-liberal economic
stabilization and structural adjustment measures deemed conditions precedent
to the granting of I.M.F. fund arrangements and loans by the World
Bank." 5 "Stabilization" in the context of economic readjustment according
to I.M.F. policy priorities, refers to short-term "emergency" measures
designed to reduce economic demand and thereby to re-align an imbalance
of supply and demand." 6  "Structural Adjustment" denotes large-scale
changes to the national economic infrastructure designed to improve supply
and strengthen an economy against the eventuality of economic crisis,
conditions of the World Bank's policy-based lending program." 7 Both
"' Bill Coleman and Patty Coleman, Government Blames Church for Chiapas: Mexican
Uprising Fed on Poverty, Oppression, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Jan. 14, 1994;
... Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America:
Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neo-Liberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L.
221, 247 (1994).
116 Id.
... Id. at 248.
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I.M.F. and World Bank programs release funds in installments for which
recipient nations qualify once they meet performance criteria."' The
elements of these stabilization programs, though differing from nation to
nation, consistently promote liberalization of foreign and domestic trade and
privatization of previously public enterprises." 9
Although the World Bank cited "minimization of the cost of adjustment
to the poorest," among its defined objectives for structural adjustment
loans, 2 ° vulnerable groups, specifically the indigenous peoples, have borne
the greatest costs of structural adjustment in Mexico. The Mexican
government was able, through economic stabilization and adjustment
undertaken with funding arrangements provided by the I.M.F. and several
billion in loans from the World Bank,' to dramatically cut inflation,
eliminate fiscal deficit, privatize and deregulate previously state-owned
industries,' and re-invent trade policy by significantly reducing tariffs,
import taxation and quantitative restrictions." These fiscal gains of
privatization were made, however, at the expense of nationalization and
social welfare measures which had been instituted for, and often in the name
of, politically and economically vulnerable groups such as indigenous ethnic
groups."' Indigenous peoples, deprived of lands, often victims of unjust
laws "'25 and violations of their constitutional guarantees, without access to
the capital necessary to survival in a free market, stand to lose the most from
privatization. "The ethnic and economic rivalries to which nationalization
was in part a response are not in reality smoothed over in a new national
project of cooperative joint enterprise. Instead, the old divisions reappear
and worsen."' 26
118 Id.
"9 Id. at 249.
12' Other stated objectives are: "(1) the correction of balance of payments imbalances, (2)
the elimination of distortions and promotion of microeconomic efficiency, (3) the reduction
of high inflation rates, (4) the protection or resumption of output growth..." Id. at n. 148,
quoting FAHRETTIN YAGCI ET AL., STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LENDING: AN EVALUATION
OF PROGRAM DESIGN 7, 15 (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 735, (1985)).
121 Id. at 253.
22 Id. at 254.
123 Id. at 255.
124 Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-NationalizationCycle: The Link Between Markets
and Ethnicity in developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1995).
,25 Such as the Penal Code of Chiapas.
126 Chua, supra note 124, at 284.
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These divisions include great economic disparities; the wealthiest twenty
percent of the Mexican population earns fifteen times more than the poorest
twenty percent. 127 In addition, the acceleration of these class divisions has
been directly attributed by some to the effects of economic adjustment in
accordance with I.M.F. and World Bank policies. 128
With the dismantling of social welfare, and economic restructuring
according to these policies, "[t]hese liberalizing measures increase the
polarization of wealth by class, gender, race and nations...
The practical effect of this shift has had a deleterious effect on the status
of indigenous peoples. The pressures of globalization of markets pits the
collective national economic good against individual indigenous communi-
ties; national economic survival in a global market depends upon exportation
of resources and the subsistence farming of indigenous groups threatens
national economic advancement. 13 There is, as yet, little room in a
privatized market for the resources and abilities of the indigenous
groups.' The exigency of economic marginalization necessitates recourse
to community juridical systems to prevent legal exploitation as a means
toward resource exploitation-taking the gavel out of the hands of the
collective interests, interests which are foreign to the indigenous communi-
ties.
V. CONCLUSION
If "[e]very revolution tries to bring back a golden age," if "[t]he 'eternal
return' is one of the implicit assumptions of almost every revolutionary
'27 Carrasco, supra note 115, at 257.
128 Asoka Bandarage, Population and Development: Toward a Social Justice Agenda,
HUNGER NOTES 19 (1994); June Nash, The New World Disorder: A View From Chiapas,
Mexico, INDIGENOUS PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATION-STATE IN LATIN AMERICA, (Vinson H.
Sutlive & Tomoko Hamada, eds. (1995)).
.29 Nash, supra note 128, at 174; see U.N. Development Programme, HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT (1994).
"'See Nash, supra note 128, at 179 ("The removal of subsidies, including those for corn,
the main subsistence crop which small plot cultivators sell for cash, allowed subsidized corn
from the U.S. to glut the Mexican market even before the passage of NAFTA. This has
forced many corn farmers off the land..."); David Barkin, The End to Food Self-sufficiency
in Mexico, LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 54 (1987).
"' Indigenous peoples' fear of complete marginalization at the hands of large collective
interests with the passage of NAFTA, led the EZLN to commence its insurgency movement
on Jan. 1, 1994, coinciding with the day on which NAFTA was to go into effect; Vargas,
supra note 3, at 1.
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theory,"' 3 2 the indigenous peoples of southern Mexico must cull from the
glory of their traditions those elements which fit the contours of present
political realities and meet the exigencies of the present day. A means of
recourse for indigenous peoples to traditional customary law or to judges
who are recognized by the community as authoritative and who will take
customary normative standards into account is a legitimate and necessary
response to the present needs of the indigenous peoples. The legitimacy of
this notion, whether viewed separately or as a part of the entire scheme of
indigenous demands for political accountability and measures of self-
determination, may be derived from the various international legal documents
which address the rights of indigenous peoples either directly or through
implication.
The necessity of such measures comes from the dynamics of collective
Mexican interests and the pressure they exert on the indigenous groups.
Without some legitimate judicial authority which will take into account the
unique problems and solutions of indigenous peoples, the Indians of southern
Mexico will experience even greater marginalization at the hands of local
despots and globalized interests.
"2Octavio Paz, DE LA INDEPENDENCIA A LA REVOLUCION, EL LABERINTO DE LA
SOLEDAD (1950) ("Toda revolucion tiende a establecer una edad mitica ... El 'eterno
retomo' es uno de los supuestos implicitos de casi toda teoria revolucionaria.").
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